


Secure Cloud-Assisted Smart Cars: Dynamic Groups and ABAC

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L13-2
CS6393
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
➤ Contribution

- ❖ Propose formalized ABAC model for cloud assisted applications.
- ❖ Dynamic groups and user preferences.
- ❖ Implementation of the model in AWS.


➤ Scope

- ❖ Single Central Cloud
- ❖ No direct access and physical tampering
- ❖ Communication Channel is encrypted.
- ❖ Data in Cloud is secure
- ❖ In-vehicle security not considered


- **ABAC**: Decision based on the attributes of entities
 - Attributes are name value pairs: **age (Alice) → 29**
 - Core entities in ABAC include:
 - ❖ Users
 - ❖ Objects
 - ❖ Environment or Context
 - ❖ Operations
- } **Attributes**
- **Authorization Policies**: determine rights just in time
 - ❖ retrieve attributes of relevant entities in request
 - Enhance flexibility and fine grained access control



- ❖ Categorizing wide locations into smaller groups.
- ❖ Vehicles dynamically become member based on current GPS, vehicle-type or individual user preferences.
- ❖ Ensure relevance of alerts and notifications



Vehicles move and are assigned to different groups and inherit their attributes/alerts.



Speed Limit: 50 mph
Deer Threat: ON
Ice on Road: NO

Speed Limit: 30 mph
Flood Warning: ON
Road Work: ON

```
{"state": {"reported": {"Latitude": "29.4769353",  
"Longitude": "-98.5018237"}}}}
```


Reported MQTT message

Administrative Questions:


- How the attributes or alerts of groups are updated?
- How are moving entities assigned to groups?
- How groups hierarchy is created?

Operational Questions:


- How attributes and groups are used to provide security?
- How user privacy preferences are considered?



user, sensor, car, mechanic,
restaurant




{ location, size, IP, direction, speed,
VIN, cuisine-type }



{ read, write, control, notify, administrative actions }

Cars, traffic lights, smart-devices


Sensor, ECU, on-board apps



Location groups, service-specific, vehicle-type

Operational and Administrative Activities

{notification, alerts, group hierarchy updates}



System Wide Policies

Individualized Privacy Policies

Basic Sets and Functions

- S, CO, O, G, OP are finite sets of sources, clustered objects, objects, groups and operations respectively [blue circles in Figure 4].
- A is a finite set of activities which can be performed in system.
- ATT is a finite set of attributes associated with S, CO, O, G and system-wide. **Attribute Function**
- For each attribute att in ATT, Range(att) is a finite set of atomic values.
- attType: ATT = {set, atomic}, defines attributes to be set or atomic valued. **Attribute Type**
- Each attribute att in ATT maps entities in S, CO, O, G to attribute values. Formally,

$$\text{att} : S \cup CO \cup O \cup G \cup \{\text{system-wide}\} \rightarrow \begin{cases} \text{Range}(\text{att}) \cup \{\perp\} & \text{if attType}(\text{att}) = \text{atomic} \\ 2^{\text{Range}(\text{att})} & \text{if attType}(\text{att}) = \text{set} \end{cases}$$
- POL is a finite set of authorization policies associated with individual S, CO, O, G.
- directG : CO → G, mapping each clustered object to a system group, equivalently CGA ⊆ CO × G.
- parentCO : O → CO, mapping each object to a clustered object, equivalently OCA ⊆ O × CO.
- GH ⊆ G × G, a partial order relation ≥_g on G. Equivalently, parentG : G → 2^G, mapping group to a set of parent groups in hierarchy.

Group Hierarchy

Attribute Mapping

Effective Attributes of Groups, Clustered Objects and Objects (Derived Functions)

– For each attribute att in ATT such that $attType(att) = set$:

- $effG_{att} : G \rightarrow 2^{Range(att)}$, defined as $effG_{att}(g_i) = att(g_i) \cup \left(\bigcup_{g \in \{g_j | g_i \succeq_g g_j\}} effG_{att}(g) \right)$.
- $effCO_{att} : CO \rightarrow 2^{Range(att)}$, defined as $effCO_{att}(co) = att(co) \cup effG_{att}(directG(co))$.
- $effO_{att} : O \rightarrow 2^{Range(att)}$, defined as $effO_{att}(o) = att(o) \cup effCO_{att}(parentCO(o))$.

– For each attribute att in ATT such that $attType(att) = atomic$:

- $effG_{att} : G \rightarrow Range(att) \cup \{\perp\}$, defined as $effG_{att}(g_i) = \begin{cases} att(g_i) & \text{if } \forall g' \in parentG(g_i). effG_{att}(g') = \perp \\ effG_{att}(g') & \text{if } \exists parentG(g_i). effG_{att}(parentG(g_i)) \neq \perp \text{ then select} \\ & \text{parent } g' \text{ with } effG_{att}(g') \neq \perp \text{ updated most recently.} \end{cases}$
- $effCO_{att} : CO \rightarrow Range(att) \cup \{\perp\}$, defined as $effCO_{att}(co) = \begin{cases} att(co) & \text{if } effG_{att}(directG(co)) = \perp \\ effG_{att}(directG(co)) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$
- $effO_{att} : O \rightarrow Range(att) \cup \{\perp\}$, defined as $effO_{att}(o) = \begin{cases} att(o) & \text{if } effCO_{att}(parentCO(o)) = \perp \\ effCO_{att}(parentCO(o)) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$

Attributes more Dynamic

Attributes Inheritance

Authorization Functions (Policies)

– Authorization Function: For each $op \in OP$, $Auth_{op}(s : S, ob : CO \cup O \cup G)$ is a propositional logic formula returning true or false, which is defined using the following policy language:

- $\alpha ::= \alpha \wedge \alpha \mid \alpha \vee \alpha \mid (\alpha) \mid \neg \alpha \mid \exists x \in set. \alpha \mid \forall x \in set. \alpha \mid set \Delta set \mid atomic \in set \mid atomic \notin set$
- $\Delta ::= \subset \mid \subseteq \mid \not\subseteq \mid \cap \mid \cup$
- $set ::= eff_{att}(i) \mid att(i)$ for $att \in ATT, i \in S \cup CO \cup O \cup G \cup \{system-wide\}, attType(att) = set$
- $atomic ::= eff_{att}(i) \mid att(i) \mid value$ for $att \in ATT, i \in S \cup CO \cup O \cup G \cup \{system-wide\}, attType(att) = atomic$

❖ Administrators in the police department can send alert to location-groups in city limits.

$Auth_{alert}(u:U, g:G) ::= dept(u) = Police \wedge parent-city(g) = Austin \wedge Austin \in jurisdiction(u).$

❖ Only mechanic in the technician department from Toyota-X dealership must be able to read sensor in Camry LE. Further, this operation must be done between time 9 am to 6 pm.

$Auth_{read}(u:U, co:CO) ::= role(u) = Technician \wedge employer(u) = Toyota-X \wedge make(co) = Toyota \wedge model(co) = Camry LE \wedge operation_time(u) \in \{9am, 10, 11 \dots 6pm\}$

Authorization Decision

– A source $s \in S$ is allowed to perform an activity $a \in A$, stated as $\text{Authorization}(a : A, s : S)$, if the required policies needed to allow the activity are included and evaluated to make final decision. These multi-layer policies must be evaluated for individual operations ($op_i \in OP$) to be performed by source $s \in S$ on relevant objects ($x_i \in CO \cup O \cup G$)

Formally, $\text{Authorization}(a : A, s : S) \Rightarrow \text{Auth}_{op_1}(s : S, x_1), \text{Auth}_{op_2}(s : S, x_2), \dots, \text{Auth}_{op_n}(s : S, x_n)$

Evaluate all relevant policies to make a decision

A restaurant in group A must be allowed to send notifications to all vehicles in location group A and group B.

I only want notifications from Cheesecake factory.


System defined



DECISION

User Preference

Implementation in Amazon Web Services (AWS)



4 Location Groups
(static demarcation)

Vehicles movement
(coordinates generated
using Google API)

```
('Received new coordinates from:', 'Vehicle-1')
Sun May 27 02:56:30 2018
```

```
Location A
  Car-A : [u'Vehicle-1', u'Vehicle-2']
  Bus-A : []
Location B
  Car-B : []
  Bus-B : [u'Vehicle-6']
Location C
  Car-C : [u'Vehicle-3', u'Vehicle-4']
  Bus-C : []
Location D
  Car-D : []
  Bus-D : [u'Vehicle-5']
```

Snapshot (table keeps changing)

➤ Administrative Policy

- ❖ Road side motion sensor with [id = 1] and current GPS in group [Location-A] can only [modify] attribute [Deer Threat] to value [ON, OFF] for group [Location-A].

➤ Operational Policy

Restaurant Notification Use Case

System Defined Policy

- ❖ A restaurant located within group [Location-A] can only [send notifications] to members of groups [Location-A, Location-B].

User Preferences


- ❖ Send notifications only between [7 pm to 9 pm] only on [Wednesdays].

| Number of Requests | Policy Enforcer Execution Time (in ms) |
|--------------------|--|
| 10 | 0.0501 |
| 20 | 0.1011 |
| 30 | 0.1264 |
| 40 | 0.1630 |
| 50 | 0.1999 |

Policy Enforcement Time

| n th Request | CARS NOTIFIED | |
|-------------------------|------------------|----------------|
| | With ABAC Policy | Without Policy |
| 41 st | 2 | 5 |
| 42 nd | 3 | 5 |
| 43 rd | 5 | 5 |
| 44 th | 3 | 5 |
| 45 th | 2 | 5 |
| 46 th | 3 | 5 |

Relevance of Alerts and Notifications



Comparing Policy vs No Policy Execution Time

- Proposed an **Attribute Based Access Control** solution for cloud assisted Smart Cars.
 - ❖ Introduced Dynamic Groups
 - ❖ Supports User Privacy Preferences and Location Centric
 - ❖ Proof of Concept implementation in AWS

- Future Research
 - ❖ Extensive and detailed evaluation
 - ❖ V2V and V2I secure trusted communication using Edge
 - ❖ Location preserving approaches